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 WAS BIGFOOT’S SEX SLAVE, blares one headline; LOCH NESS 
MONSTER IS DEAD reads another (and hilariously:  “Dick Cheney is a 
Robot” yet another).1 The Weekly World News, favored repository for tabloid 
accounts of monstrous and imaginary beasts covers Bigfoot, Nessie and 
others with devoted adoration, not least for the numbers their appearance can 
add to circulation. Like the sensationalist accounts of dragons Jan Stirm analyzes, 
tabloid creatures thrill and titillate, fascinate and terrify. Their role is partly 
social—they are “about” the social itself, creating relationships among their 
readers who are “insiders” with special knowledge about the world that others 
do not see. These are monsters with an important purpose, as Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen points out: the monster’s body is a “cultural body” that emerges only at a 
specific time and place, birthed from cultural patterns, shocks and adaptations 
that require a beast on which anxieties and aspirations can be inscribed.2  
Monsters register unstable boundaries between groups of things that should 
remain divided by category, by species, or other qualities; they “rebuke” 
traditional modes of knowledge, yet warn against certain kinds of exploration. 
“The monster resists capture in the epistemological nets of the erudite.”3  
Here be Stirm’s dragons, then, with their multiple origins in both nature 
and the supernatural, revealing human desires in all their improbable forms; here 
also are Christopher Clary’s witches’ familiars, shapeshifters and skinwalkers like 
The Witch of Edmonton’s Tom, who participate in a world filled with the pitfalls of 
perversion. I want to respond to this cluster of essays on fabulous beasts by 
focusing on the interconnections between Stirm’s clearly marked monsters, and 
Clary’s possibly less obvious ones. Clary wants to move beyond the kind of 
knowledge that has usually derived from exploring liminal creatures, knowledge 
that dead-ends in observing the dismantling of a binary, and seeks instead to 
chart “early modern anxieties about female autonomy and desire, the body’s 
vulnerability, and a wide variety of threatening human-animal relationships.” Yet 
his essay begins by invoking two creatures from Macbeth that are not quite 
identical in origin or connotation. While “paddock” is a type of toad or frog 
(Edward Topsell), “Grimalkin” or “Graymalkin” is, according to the OED, “A 
name given to a cat; hence, a cat, esp. an old she-cat; contemptuously applied to 
a jealous or imperious old woman.” One is a “simple” beast, then, while the 
other is a companion animal.  William Baldwin’s Beware the Cat tells the tale of 
one Grimalkin who swallows up a sheep and a cow stolen by a kern and his boy 
after they murder the animals’ owners, but is then herself killed by the kern when 




likeness,” since “Malkin is a woman’s name” according to a member of the 
human audience to the tale.4 Woman and cat, then, overlap as monstrous for 
their exercise of appetite, which seems to clearly signal they are instruments of 
the Devil, and at the same time act as agents of justice and retribution.  
Elsewhere in early modern literature, however, Grimalkin might merely be a 
common name for a “harmless” household cat.5 The full account of cat 
subculture in Beware the Cat, in fact, emphasizes the bond that links household 
pets, in this case kittens, to the shape-shifting cat lady—one tiny “kitling” claws 
to death the kern himself as he narrates his adventure to his wife. If Grimalkin is 
a (shapeshifted human) witch, the kittens who gather news of her death and 
abandon or attack their human companions are clearly ordinary animal 
companions.  The text, in other words, links Grimalkin’s capacity for monstrous 
behavior to every “grimalkin’s” similar potential. 
  Clary is right in calling for an advance on the usual conclusion that 
animals trouble the ontological status of the human and confuse supposed 
boundaries between species. He is right again for pointing to the role of 
embodiment, especially human bodily vulnerability in concocting the attributes 
that define the witch’s familiar.  It is no accident that one of the most common 
memes concerning monstrous beasts in today’s tabloids involves sex and 
reproduction. Monsters pierce the matter that is us; they consume us; they make 
a mockery of histories or schema involving species distinctions altogether. Fear 
of the monster is also desire for it (although what that means for Dick Cheney I 
hesitate to speculate)—desire not just for the monster’s bodily qualities, to either 
possess them or lose oneself in them, but desire also for the kind of knowledge 
the monster seems to promise, the position it occupies outside of the constraints 
of social convention. Baldwin’s tale, after all, revolves around a human, Master 
Streamer, who is willing to dose himself with magical potions to enter the feline 
world. The “grotesque and disordered diversity” of the witches’ cauldron in 
Macbeth, or Elizabeth Sawyer’s description of the “common sink” of men’s 
mouths certainly does, as Clary observes, put the accessibility of women, their 
mobility (both categorical and physical) and their desire at the heart of the 
familiar’s disruptive “disorienting” nature in these plays. But I think singling out 
witches’ familiars as distinct from ordinary household companion creatures may 
create a distinction where there is, for both early moderns and postmoderns, not 
so much of one.  
Others have walked right up to the household pet and observed its 
monstrosity, but have turned away from making a clear statement about it:  in at 
least two of his essays on monsters, for instance, Cohen almost names this link.6 
We are accustomed to thinking of pet-keeping as a positive, even healthy 
undertaking, but early moderns mainly disagreed.7 Those who showered 
attention on mere animals were suspected of being guilty of a number of sins—
from Chaucer’s Prioress, whose misdirected sensitivities and privileged comfort 
is signaled through her love of a lap dog, to Sidney’s Stella, who dotes overmuch 
on her own pet pooch, pets usurp the place of human familiars (understood in 
the root sense of family), but also the resources, emotional and material, that 
should ideally be bestowed on people.8 They draw human focus away from the 
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claims of species kinship. The moral pressure to devalue animals in early 
modernity (and sometimes in postmodernity), I would argue, is also motivated in 
part by the secret fear humans harbor that in fact they are not as worthy of love 
and plenty as non-human creatures might be, an example of what Laurie 
Shannon explores as negative exceptionalism in the case of Shakespeare’s plays, 
but more widely understood and distributed across species than Shannon may 
imagine. Where pets are concerned, we could add to her list of physiological and 
moral attributes that humans lack the capacity to give and accept love without 
conditions and across the abyss of difference.9 Divine injunctions to “love thy 
neighbor” lead to a sense of betrayal felt by those who attend to them when 
those neighbors prove that they are, in fact, not superior to animals, not 
endowed with higher capacities of reason or affection. In a fascinating sixteenth-
century ballad, Great News from Southwark; or The Old Woman’s Legacy to her Cat, the 
original “cat lady” is paradoxically berated for being “covetous” because she 
denies herself food or clothing, and subsists on her neighbors’ charity, all the 
while showering love and food on her pet cat, her “small family,” who grows 
plump as she grows thin.10 When she dies those neighbors find her stash of 1800 
pounds, ultimately “wasted” in a legacy to the beloved animal. Meanwhile the 
balladeer of My Dog and I announces “We write no fights of Dutch or French, / . 
. . / No Monsters, Wonders in the Air,” but only “of my Dog and I.”  The dog, 
the ballad insists, is the perfect companion, joining the speaker in contriving a 
sex-filled “single life” by offering women “from fifteen to fifty” the remedy for 
barrenness or greensickness. At the end of his life, the ballad tells us, we’ll find 
the speaker in the grave “Cheek by jowl my Dog and I.”11 
 Animals fill a need that humans don’t, perhaps that humans can’t. There 
may well be erotic pleasures we can attach to pets that are inexpressible in 
human terms—the pleasures of scent and touch, unimpeded by socially fraught 
meanings. Pets in themselves are necessarily multiple, like Stirm’s dragons, 
assignable to too many categories.  They are human mirrors, assumed to offer 
evidence of our supposed superiority; but they are funhouse mirrors, distorting 
our image, reflecting dimensions of ourselves we aren’t entirely comfortable 
with, as Derrida finds to his chagrin when his little cat peers at his naked body.12  
Pets are at once essential prostheses (no human can hunt mice and rats as well as 
a cat) and completely useless pits of resources (feeding hounds and horses could 
bankrupt an early modern household).  They must be able to turn instantly from 
agents into objects, according to Yi Fu Tuan: “The pet, if it is to find acceptance 
in a well-run household, must learn to be immobile—to be as unobtrusive as a 
piece of furniture.”13 This might sound an overly modern expectation to apply to 
early moderns, but Beware the Cat makes it clear that the various cats and kittens 
Streamer encounters are indeed treated as if they are mere objects, part of the 
environment with no agency of their own. The sheer matter of a pet is malleable:  
through breeding, they become at once more and less than “nature” once made 
them, growing or shrinking, developing particular coloring or anatomical 
qualities. As Stirm oberves, most ecocriticism is occupied with the problem of 
knowing a nature that either withdraws or transforms as we attempt to know it. 
Pets are the material reminder that this is so—they seem to straddle the 
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borderline between wild and domestic, but the more we attempt to know them 
as nature, the more they resemble us, something recent scientific studies keep 
proving over and over.14 And knowing a companion species is an exercise in 
quantum physics:  as soon as we investigate, as soon as we focus our 
epistemological apparatus on that animal, it changes, it becomes something 
other. In the end, all pets are Schrödinger’s cats (existing in multiple states of 
being at once), and all are also Edmonton’s Tom, whose “true” shape is 
unknowable under the layers of corpse clothing that make him what he is. 
Companion animals may occupy the margins of households, but they 
are somehow ambiguously powerful, as Clary’s account of familiars makes clear. 
Where Stirm’s dragons seem distinct from household pets because they are 
distant, “wonderful” creatures onto which are projected human epistemological 
desires that can’t be satisfied, pets appear to allow those same desires exercise 
closer to home. But what if dragon tales also express the unsatisfiable desires 
familiar animals arouse—evidence, for one thing, that we can’t have the 
encounters with non-humans that we wish we could have? To be Bigfoot’s sex 
slave is to be diminished, reduced to sexual object; but also to belong, to have 
possession in the animality that defines Bigfoot. We love our pets because we 
long for union with the nature that they are, and are not.  The poor old cat lady 
of Great News from Southwark keeps nothing of her “belly-money” for herself, but 
she showers her animal with “dainties” so that it is “plump as any doe.”15 The 
ballad turns on the trick that though she treated the cat as a child of her own 
flesh (“Her belly sav’d it for her Cat” repeats the poem) “Puss must show the 
will” to inherit, mocking the animal with its extra-legal status. We know that cat 
ladies disrupt social norms by treating cats as surrogate children; what we often 
fail to ask is why a cat is a preferable recipient of attention and affection to a 
child.  
Monsters, critics are fond of pointing out, are labeled with a term that 
derives from the Latin monstrum for portent or sign.  Fabulous, on the other 
hand, signifies both a product of fabulation or falsehood, but also part of the 
traditional of fables or myths.16 Monstrous and fabulous creatures are thus 
caught up in two intersecting epistemological networks, one that requires reading 
and interpretation to understand a larger dimension of reality, the other that 
hints at the hazards that attend any such effort. Stirm’s and Clary’s fabulous 
monsters invite and perplex because they are both near and far, human and non-
human, boundary crossers and boundary creators. We see them diffusely, 
partially, through a fog, much as we see Bigfoot or Nessie. And what we see is 
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